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Barbara Darby* Amending Authors
and Constitutional Discourse
The author surveys various theories related to the concept of constitutional
amendment, reviewing the importance of the notion of authorship to the amending
process, and the related theories about constitutional legitimacy and judicial
activism. In seeking an alternative conceptualization of authorship that is
applicable to constitutional amendment, she reviews Michel Foucault's essay on
authorship, and specifically his notion of the transdiscursive author who originates
a "return" to an original text, which she presents as a useful context in which to
read the constitutional amendment process. Constitutional discourse, using
Foucault's approach to discourse, occupies a significant cultural and social
position. She then provides a reading of four Supreme Court of Canada judgments
on the issue of constitutional amendment (The Senate Reference, the Patriation
Reference, the Quebec Veto Reference, and the Secession Reference), arguing
that the Court moves towards a discursive view of Canadian constitutionalism
and amendment that conceptualizes the legitimate amending authors of the
Canadian constitution as the Canadian people, recognizing the relevance of the
Constitutional text itself, the nature of Canadian democracy, regionalism, and
Charter values. Thus, the author argues, the Court's analysis of constitutional
amendment provides a significant moment in nation building by constituting
Canadian citizens as self-governing, self-constituting, and self-writing.
L'auteur passe en revue diverses th6ories relatives au concept de I'amendement
de la Constitution et se penche en particulier sur la notion de paternite du
processus d'amendement et les theories connexes de legitimitd constitutionnelle
et d'activisme judiciaire. Cherchant une autre conceptualisation de la patemite
qui s'applique au processus d'amendement constitutionnel, I'auteure reprend
I'analyse de Michel Foucault dans son essai sur la paternit6 et, en particulier, sa
notion de I'auteur transdiscursif qui preconise un retour au texte d'origine. Elle
estime que cette demarche fournit un contexte utile pour en arriver A une meilleure
comprehension du processus d'amendement constitutionnel. Selon I'approche
de Foucault, le discours constitutionnel occupe une place prdpond6rante sur le
plan social et culturel. L'auteure propose ensuite une reflexion sur quatre decisions
de la Cour supr6me sur la question de I'amendement de la Constitution (le renvoi
du S6nat, le renvoi relatif a la canadianisation de la constitution, le renvoi relatif
au droit de v6to du Quebec et enfin le renvoi relatif au projet de secession). Elle
argue que la Cour gravite vers une vision discursive du constitutionalisme
canadien et de I'amendement de la Constitution qui confere au peuple canadien
la paternitd lgitime de tout projet d'amendement constitutionnel. La Cour
reconnait ainsi la pertinence du texte de la Constitution, la nature de la democratie
et du regionalisme canadiens de m~me que les valeurs de la Charte. L'auteure
conclut que I'analyse de I'amendement de la Constitution auquel s'est livree la
Cour supr6me marque un tournant d6cisif dans I'affirmation du pays, car les
citoyens canadiens en emergent doues de la capacit6 de se gouverner, de
formuler leur propre constitution voire d'assumer la paternit6 des textes de loi
qui les gouvernent.
* Barbara Darby graduated from Dalhousie Law School in 2002. She practices law with Gillis &
Associates in Bedford, Nova Scotia.
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Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau wrote in 1968 that "constitutions are
made for men and not men for constitutions. However, one tends to forget
that constitutions must also be made by men and not by force of brutal
circumstance or blind disorder."' At the same time that this quotation em-
phasizes the human activity of making and writing, it also points out -
perhaps benignly, perhaps not - that the actors involved may be members
of an exclusive constituency: did Trudeau mean that it was men and not
women who make constitutions? Or is Trudeau using a synecdoche, tak-
ing "men" to mean "people"? Without actually knowing what "made by
men" means, or lacking sufficient information to agree to overlook the
terminology's exclusionary propensity, we might be uncertain about the
legitimacy or authority of the men, and maybe of Trudeau as well, as
author of this statement. Is this quotation more (or less) meaningful to you
because it is attributed to Trudeau and not someone else?
1. Cited in Lorraine E. Weinrib, "Trudeau and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A
Question of Constitutional Maturation" in Andrew Cohen & J.L. Granatstein, eds., Trudeau s Shadow:
The Life and Legacy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 1998) 257 at 259.
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Introduction
This paper explores different ideas about constitutional authorship in
general and specifically why the conceptualization of authorship is
important in the context of constitutional amendments. By "authorship," I
mean the term to include not only the acts of individuals or groups of
people, but the values and principles that also originate the making and
amending of constitutions. My argument is that Canadian judicial review
of the Constitution has tended to reject as an interpretive guide reliance on
the idea that the constitutional text means what the original drafters
intended; the original authors are not foremost authorities for Canadian
courts. However, where the authorship of constitutional amendments is
concerned, and specifically in considering who can legitimately author a
Constitutional amendment in Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada has
paradoxically demonstrated a reliance on a doctrine of original intent (an
effort to interpret the text in accordance with the meanings attributed to it
by those who originally wrote it).2 Importantly, however, the Court has
more recently moved away from a doctrine of original intent towards
constructing a discourse of Canadian constitutionalism and constitutional
amendment that establishes what bodies, according to the Court, can be
legitimate amending authors and what procedures must direct their activi-
ties. By "discourse," I mean "not a disembodied collection of statements,
but groupings of utterances or sentences, statements which are enacted
within a social context, which are determined by that social context and
which contribute to the way that social context continues its existence."3
Such a "discursive" view of Canadian constitutional amendment does not
focus on the text alone or the meaning of words contemporary to a given
analysis of the Constitution, but instead casts a wider view as it seeks an
interpretive base, encompassing articulations about Canadian history,
political systems and structures, and broad issues of human rights. The
Court designates as the truly legitimate amending authors the Canadian
people, taken as a whole, and speaking through their representatives.
It is finally my argument that because the Court constructs a discursive
view of authorship (rather than focussing strictly on a text-based analysis
of what the Constitutional texts originally meant to drafters, or what the
texts direct about the amending process), the Court creates a view of
Canadian constitutional amendment that acknowledges historical origin,
2. See Lamer J.'s judgment in Reference Re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), S. 94(2), [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536 [Reference Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act cited to S.C.R.].
3. Sara Mills, Discourse (London: Routledge, 1997) at 11.
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changing values, and the citizenry as a whole. This is important, because
the Court not only supplies a noticeable absence in the Canadian Constitu-
tion, a reference to the Canadian people, but constructs an idea of citizen-
ship, legitimacy, and self-authorship. This is a significant movement in
Canadian constitutional commentary, for the concept of who authored the
foundational text of a country, and who can re-author it by amending it, is
central to the capacity of a people to be self-governing and declare in their
foundational legal documents not only who they are, but who they will
allow themselves to become.
I begin by discussing why some constitutional theorists see the idea of
authorship as important and how authorship as a concept relates to consti-
tutional legitimacy, judicial review, and interpretive strategies. I next con-
sider how interpretive strategies vary according to the different views taken
of authorship and the importance attached to a discernable original author
or authors. Then I will mention differences between American and Cana-
dian interpretive approaches. I then examine how Michel Foucault's theory
of authorship and discourse might inform constitutional legal theory. In
discussing authorship and constitutional amendments, I will attempt to
indicate how conceptions of authorship change when the process at issue
is the amendment of an existing constitution rather than the initiation of
one. Finally, I will survey four Supreme Court of Canada decisions
regarding the authorship of amendments to the Canadian constitution,
arguing that the Court's most recent position is to allow the legitimate
constitutional amending author to emerge from a broad discourse about
the Canadian constitutional system, rather than a particular element of the
constitutional text itself.
I. The Importance ofAuthorship in Constitutional Theory
The question of "who wrote?" or "what values originate?" a constitution is
important to constitutional legal theorists and to interpreters of constitu-
tions, although the extent to which an interpreter or theorist focuses on the
"who" of constitution making, rather than the constitutional text itself, the
process of constitution-making, or the substance of it, varies. The "who"
of constitutional authorship may itself be variously conceptualized as a set
of historically identifiable individuals (sometimes described as the "fram-
ers" of a constitution), or a set of people who are not necessarily important
as identifiable historical figures, but whose importance derives from their
participation in an original and, in hindsight, legitimate process of compo-
sition. Hereinafter, I refer to these actors, historically identifiable or not,
as "original authors."
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While my interest here is in how ideas about authors play themselves
out in constitutional legal theory, I hasten to note that authorship is by no
means important to all constitutional legal theory and there are other
explanations for where constitutions find their legitimacy, besides who
wrote them. These include that constitutions receive their legitimacy from
the very fact of their acceptance, what Frank Michelman refers to as the
"existential possibility," or because the constitution accords with a person's
sense of morality, or because it is a "dictate - of right reason."4 Jurgen
Habermas proposes that "[p]opular sovereignty and human rights provide
the two normative perspectives from which an enacted, changeable law is
supposed to be legitimated as a means to secure both the private and civic
autonomy of the individual."5
1. Legitimacy and Authorship
Recognizing that there are other explanations for constitutional legitimacy,
still, as Joseph Raz writes, "[ilt is tempting to think that the authority of
law, of any law, derives from the authority of its maker ... the identity of
the lawmaker is material to the validity of the law, at least in the case of
enacted law."6 One narrative of constitutional legitimacy in which origi-
nal authors figure prominently emphasizes the authors' identity as repre-
sentatives of a populace and their participation in a consultative and delib-
erative procedure; hence, the resulting documents these authors produce
and their procedure itself merit our respect and adherence. Why does this
matter so much? The central idea is that in constitutional democracies,
people govern themselves and, as Jed Rubenfeld notes, the process of self-
writing is key: "[A]utonomy is therefore always autobiography ... Every
exercise of human freedom is an exercise in self-life-writing ... We must
give our lives, in two words, a text."7 For Rubenfeld, written constitution-
alism "embraces the struggle for self-government over time" which is
"democracy as demo-graphy." He produces a thesis to describe this idea:
A people attains self-government not by perfecting a politics of popular
voice, but by way of an inscriptive politics, through which the people
struggles to memorialize in foundational law, and to live out over time,
its own foundational commitments.
4. Frank I. Michelman, "Constitutional Authorship" in Larry Alexander, ed., Constitutionalism: Philo-
sophical Foundations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 64 at 65.
5. Jurgen Habermas, "Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights" (1998) 24 Philosophy and
Social Criticism 157 at 159.
6. Joseph Raz, "On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries" in
Alexander, supra note 4, 152 at 157-58.
7. Jed Rubenfeld, "Legitimacy and Interpretation" in Alexander, supra note 4, 194 at 214.
8. Ibid.
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For a people to be self-governing, there must be more than a politics
permitting citizens to give voice to their will. There must be an inscrip-
tive politics at the foundation of the legal order. This inscriptive politics
would include institutions through which the policy could memorialize,
preserve, interpret, enforce, and rewrite its fundamental political com-
mitments over time. The first freedom of a self-governing people is not,
therefore, the freedom of speech. It is the freedom to write: to give one-
self a text. A fully self-governing people must be the author of its own
constitution.9
This is a remarkably important idea, that part of nation-building is na-
tion-writing. The legal and national order must be permitted to not only
arise through time, but to sustain itself over time, through written docu-
ments that can connect interpreters across time.
Michelman explores the idea that a "political-institutional constitution
has always ... the character of a law expressly and designedly laid down
by politically circumstanced human agents, which gains its bindingness
on us at least in part by force of its reputed intentionality as a product of
their express political exertion."1 This is the case, despite the fact that, as
Michelman observes, there is no inherent necessity for constitutional docu-
ments to have authors: they can be attributed value because they accord
with general constitutional ideas or theories of government or law.' He
writes about the persistent belief of many that a constitution is a "histori-
cal product of episodes of authorship.' 2 People draw a connection "be-
tween perceived historical facts of the textual "Constitution's" authorship
and the current normative authority for us, as law, of a body of practical
political principles that we take this text to express or represent."' 3
Michelman labels this connection the "authority-authorship syndrome." 4
What plagues this idea of authorship for Michelman is that in order for
original authors to claim an authority to be constitution makers, they must
rely on "some preconstitutional ground of the authority-to-make-some-
thing-be-law-by-legislating-it of whoever is supposed to have made the
Constitution be law by legislating it,"'5 which establishes an infinite re-
gress of authority. From where does the legitimacy arise?
9. Ibid. at 217-18 [emphasis added].
10. Michelman, "Constitutional Authorship", supra note 4 at 65.
11. Ibid. at 68.
12. Ibid. at 67.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid. at 72 [emphasis in original].
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The further question is, where is there room for change and who has
both the ability and the authority to change a memorializing text? If a
people have actually "memorialized" themselves, as Rubenfeld observes,
or create normative authority in writing, as Michelman observes, how can
change occur? How can we be both "constituted" by something, and
continue to constitute anew? Raz considers this conundrum: if one consti-
tutional value is that a people is to be always-already self-governing, "[n]o
one, the argument goes, can have authority over future generations.
Therefore, the authority of a constitution cannot rest on the authority of its
makers.' 6 In Michelman's words, to submit to the authority of a prior
generation is to cease to be self-governing: "The charterers ... seem to
stand, then, on a different plane of rulership from the chartered ... as
creators to creatures."' 7 In other words, are people not equally self-writ-
ing? Are the first writers more authoritative than those who follow? Why?
Michelman's resolution to this problem is to seek recourse to a set of
values that govern the authorial process. He argues that we seek a "norma-
tive like-mindedness"'8 between us-now, adhering to a constitution, and
us-then ("We the People") who wrote it, discovered in the idea that
"constitutional framers can be our framers - their history can be our his-
tory, their word can command observance from us now on popular-sover-
eignty grounds - only because and insofar as they, in our eyes now, were
already on what we judge to be the track of true constitutional reason."' 9
And so we in the present "read the words of the framers with the interpre-
tive charity of the living."2 Michelman argues elsewhere that some belief
in the legitimacy of the process is important, a process of deliberation and
participation that is "in force ... and [that] ... we judge to be reasonably
defensible as justice-seeking, "'2 a matter of belief. He thus concludes that,
in a sense, the belief in an author satisfies a sort of psycho-legal need: we
"produce an author because we have to" 22 and project upon original
authors an authority that allows us to be morally bound to what they
produced.
16. Raz, supra note 6 at 164.
17. Michelman, "Constitutional Authorship", supra note 4 at 80.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. at 81.
20. Ibid.
21. Frank I. Michelman, "How Can the People Ever Make the Laws? A Critique of Deliberative
Democracy" in James Bohman & William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1997) 145 at 166.
22. Michelman, "Constitutional Authorship", supra note 4 at 92.
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2. Illegitimacy and Authorship
But what if you do not feel morally bound? The idea of authorship is also
significant for commentators who are critical of how public ideals have
been constructed by original authors illegitimately. For example, Iris Marion
Young writes:
The white male bourgeoisie conceived republican virtue as rational, re-
strained, and chaste, not yielding to passion or desire for luxury, and thus
able to rise above desire and need to a concern for the common good. This
implied excluding poor people and wage workers from citizenship on the
grounds that they were too motivated by need to adopt a general perspec-
tive. The designers of the American Constitution were no more egalitarian
than their European brethren in this respect; they specifically intended to
restrict access of the laboring classes to the public, because they feared dis-
ruption of commitment to the general interest.
23
Her response to the process of exclusion is to posit a new way to author
new laws and policies: by changing who does the authoring: "Where some
groups are privileged and others oppressed, the formulation of law, policy,
and the rules of private institutions tend to be biased in favor of the privi-
leged groups, because their particular experience implicitly sets the norm.
24
She envisions instead an inclusive, "heterogeneous public" "where par-
ticipants discuss the issues before them and are supposed to come to a
decision that they determine is best or most just.
'25
Thus, on a fundamental level, for many constitutional commentators,
coming to grips with an idea about authorship is part of the process of
finding reasons to agree to be bound by a constitution, or equally, to find
explanations for a constitution's lack of authority. Like the oath in a court-
room which must seize one's conscience,26 similarly constitutions must
seize the conscience of citizens to be binding, and the identification of
original authors may provide this bindingness or, just as importantly,
explain its absence.
3. Judicial Review and Authorship
Another area of constitutional legal theory in which the notion of author-
ship gives rise to considerations about illegitimacy is the area of judicial
23. Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizen-
ship" in Iris Marion Young, ed., Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and
Social Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) 114 at 118.
24. Ibid. at 131.
25. Ibid. at 129.
26. R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 59 C.C.C. (3d) 92.
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review, which is related to issues of authorship because for some commen-
tators, judicial review, when undertaken illegitimately, transforms judges
from constitutional interpreters of text into constitutional authors
themselves, which runs contrary to the notion of the people being self-
governing through their legislative representatives. As Peter W. Hogg writes,
when judges are perceived to be inappropriately interpreting constitutional
provisions, "non-elected judges" gain "'a veto over the politics of the
nation,' forbidding its legislatures to reach decisions that the judges
believe are wrong. Such a veto is as unacceptable, and for the same rea-
sons, as a veto by the Queen or the Governor-General - a veto that ex-
isted in colonial times but has now been discarded as incompatible with
democracy."27 The problem is, where does interpretation end and author-
ship begin? How do you tell the dancer from the dance? Here American
and Canadian practice of and theory on judicial review diverge widely. As
Hogg writes, "[t]he problem of the legitimacy of judicial review is
...a much less serious problem in Canada than it is in the United States.
First of all, Canada adopted the Charter in full knowledge that the applica-
tion of the Charter by non-elected, non-accountable judges would nullify
the acts of elected legislative bodies and accountable officials, and would
occasionally do so in unpredictable ways" and because the Canadian Char-
ter includes the section 33 override clause enabling judicial decisions "to
be overridden by the competent legislative body.
28
a. Judicial Review in America
American discussions of judicial review of the American Constitution
diverge on the relevance or necessity of positing an original author or
authors. Some commentators advocate the centrality of the original
constitutional words; where such texts prove ambiguous, recourse to the
intent of the original authors is considered the only legitimate way to inter-
pret constitutional provisions. Other theorists argue that because original
intent is lost to us, or may no longer be. relevant, judges quite legitimately
should refer to extra-textual values to supplement their construction of
constitutional provisions. The former approach has been labelled
interpretivism, the latter noninterpretivism.
b. Interpretivism
As Christopher P. Manfredi writes, "[ilnterpretivist theories hold that judges
deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms
27. Peter W. Hogg, "The Charter Rights and American Theories of Interpretation" (1987) 25 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 87 at 93-94.
28. Ibid. at 88-89.
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that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution. ' 29 Manfredi
cites the position of Edwin Meese III, then United States Attorney-Gen-
eral, who argues that the American Supreme Court should "[g]round its
constitutional jurisprudence in the meaning that the Constitution's framers
originally attached to the language used in the document."3 Robert Bork
is another prominent advocate for interpretivism. In The Tempting of
America, he writes, "[o]nly the approach of original understanding meets
the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in or-
der to possess democratic legitimacy."31 "What the ratifiers understood
themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time
would have understood the words to mean, 3 2 rather than the subjective
view of a judge who makes "unguided value judgments of his own."33 He
states that "[t]he interpretation of the Constitution according to the origi-
nal understanding, then, is the only method that can preserve the Constitu-
tion, the separation of powers, and the liberties of the people. 3 4 Raoul
Berger advocates reading the "Constitution of the United States" as being
"frozen in the sense intended at the time of its adoption. That sense may be
derived from the plain words of the text, or where the text is ambiguous,
from evidence of the intention of the framers."35
The value of this approach for those who advocate it is that it "confines
the Court to its proper role," leaving constitution making to "the People"
rather than to judges who amend the constitution unconstitutionally. 6 Ri-
chard S. Kay writes that
What commands obedience is not a mere set of words, but the expres-
sion of an intentional historical-political act. Any attempt to apply the
Constitution's terms in a sense not intended by the human beings par-
ticipating in that historical-political act, therefore, fails to invoke the
only phenomenon that marks the Constitution off as worthy of obedi-
ence. Treating the Constitution as composed of meanings unrelated to
29. Christopher R Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal
Constitutionalism (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993) at 40. For additional sources re-
garding American views of interpretation, see William F. Harris II, The Interpretable Constitution
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
30. Manfredi, ibid. at 41.
31. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free
Press, 1990) at 143.
32. Ibid. at 144.
33. Ibid. at 146.
34. Ibid. at 159.
35. Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971),
cited in Hogg, supra note 27 at 94.
36. Hogg, ibid. at 95.
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its history makes it a different text, one no more legitimate for the pur-
pose of limiting government than the constitution of another state or the
rules of major league baseball.37
The interpretivist approach is seen to maintain constitutional integrity
by binding judges to original intent rather than other values of their own
devising that may be hard to discern, or are not associated with any form
of consensus or test of time, especially where a particular interpretation
has withstood scrutiny over time (unlike interpretations that would uphold
racial segregation, for instance).
There are numerous arguments against this approach, however. They
include the question about whether an original intent can be ascertained at
all; about whether it is appropriate to govern a country according to often
centuries-old values rather than contemporary ones, given that times change;
and the question of whether the original framers intended their words to be
frozen, or if, instead, "they were content to leave the detailed application
of the constitution to the courts of the future.
'" 38
c. Noninterpretivism
According to Hogg, noninterpretivism
is the theory that holds that the text is so vague and indeterminate that
the courts are inevitably driven to apply standards that are not found in
the text. Once having rejected the text as the source of the standards of
judicial review, the noninterpretists have to explain where the standards
of judicial review come from, and a variety of sources have been sug-
gested: for example, the moral values of the judge, the moral values of
society, or some variant of natural law, usually in the form of a theory of
justice, democracy, or morality.39
Like interpretivism, this model has an important notion of the original
author, but here the judge is seen as legitimately acting the role of author.
This is not to indicate that a judge is free to "authorize" his or her views of
what a constitution sanctions and then to impose that view on a public.
Ronald Dworkin, for instance, would not be as quick as Hogg to suggest a
constitution is "so vague and indeterminate." Rather, as Dworkin phrases
it in describing what he calls a "moral reading" of the American Constitu-
tion, the interpreter's role is to recognize that "we all - judges, lawyers,
37. Richard S. Kay, "American Constitutionalism" in Alexander, supra note 4, 16 at 31.
38. Hogg, supra note 27 at 96. For other critiques ofinterpretivism, see Bork, supra note 31.
39. Hogg, ibid. at 91.
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citizens - interpret and apply these abstract [constitutional] clauses [de-
claring individual rights] on the understanding that they invoke moral prin-
ciples about political decency and justice. '4° The noninterpretivist approach
Dworkin endorses begins the process of constitutional interpretation by
understanding "what the framers said" and the historical context in which
they said it, and then produces an interpretation that preserves "constitu-
tional integrity":
Judges may not read their own convictions into the Constitution. They
may not read the abstract moral clauses as expressing any particular moral
judgment, no matter how much that judgment appeals to them, unless
they find it consistent in principle with the structural design of the Con-
stitution as a whole, and also with the dominant lines of past constitu-
tional interpretation by other judges. They must regard themselves as
partners with other officials, past and future, who together elaborate a
coherent constitutional morality, and they must take care to see that what
they contribute fits with the rest. (I have elsewhere said that judges are
like authors jointly creating a chain novel in which each writes a chapter
that makes sense as party of the story as a whole.)41
A critic of the approach, Manfredi notes that this approach "view[s]
... the task of constitutional interpretation as a creative one of identifying
and applying novel rights to determine the validity of legislation.
42
Critics of noninterpretivism thus may seize upon the notion of a judge
bestowing, inappropriately, "novel" rights on citizens. However, the ad-
vantage of non-interpretivism is that it permits incremental constitutional
change via interpretation, whereas adherence to original intent of the drafters
may in some situations bind a country to values it later finds abhorrent.
For example, commentators such as Raoul Berger argue that the original
framers did not intend to end racial segregation of schools; however, for
the United States to continue to adhere to this intent would be to swallow
"a difficult pill,"43 according to Hogg.
Judicial creativity, however, may also be a difficult pill for some to
swallow, and the argument against noninterpretivism is the counterpart of
the argument in favour of interpretivism, that allowing for extra-textual
and more importantly, non-accountable judge's values to influence deci-
40. R.M. Dworkin, Freedom s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996) at 2.
41. Ibid. at 10.
42. Manfredi, supra note 29 at 41.
43. Hogg, supra note 27 at 95.
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sions about the constitutionality of legislative provisions, for instance,
means that a people cease to be bound by the constitution and thus cease
therefore to be self-governing.
d. Middle Ground and the Canadian Position
There are also theories of interpretation that fall between these two poles.
John H. Ely's position is that "the Constitution itself illuminates the exter-
nal meaning that can legitimately be injected into [the Constitution].""
His aim is to "restrict [judicial] activism to its proper sphere"45 of process,
and one such sphere is to repair defects in a country's "representative in-
stitutions of pluralist democracy."46 Arguments against Ely, however, are
that a Court reviewing only matters of process would not make important
substantive changes in areas like human rights.47 Hogg defends Ely's po-
sition by arguing that Ely "is not advocating that the judges apply values
drawn from some source outside the constitution: he finds the governing
values in the structure of the constitution itself."48
While there are Canadian theorists who embrace the idea of
interpretivism,4 9 other commentators write that the Canadian judicial posi-
tion on interpretation has been to "enthusiastically embrace ... non-
interpretivism."50 Mahmud Jamal and Matthew Taylor note that the
Supreme Court "usually rejected 'drafters' intention' as an interpretative
approach."'" Instead, the Court is said to advocate a "purposive method"
towards "the interests which the Charter provision was designed to protect
and to interpret the provision in accordance with those purposes" which
has resulted in "broad and liberal interpretations being given to the various
provisions. 5
2
Patrick Monahan also argues a version of the middle ground associ-
ated with Ely above, arguing "that judges should restrict their evaluation
to the consistency of [legislative] ... policies with values explicitly con-
44. Manfredi, supra note 29 at 43, citing John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial
Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,
On Reading the Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 6, write that the
American Constitution is "a framework; it is not a blueprint."
45. Manfredi, ibid. at 44.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Hogg. supra note 27 at 102.
49. See Ranier Knopff & EL.Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992).
50. Manfredi, supra note 29 at 52.
51. Mahmud Jamal & Matthew Taylor, The Charter of Rights in Litigation: Direction from the Su-
preme Court of Canada, vol. 1, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2003) at 1-9.
52. Ibid. at 5-2.
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tained in the constitutional document"53 such as representative democracy
and communal values that distinguish the Canadian from the American
constitution.
Hogg describes the Canadian position as "progressive interpretation"
which is not author-oriented in its "principle of minimal reliance on legis-
lative history" and its rejection of any freezing of constitutional language
in "the sense in which it would have been understood in 1867."l' True to
what seems to have become a stereotype of Canadian reconciliation, how-
ever, Hogg suggests that this position actually does accord with original
intent by perceiving in the framers "the interpretive intent that would per-
mit progressive interpretation."55 He argues that the original language of
the text is central, but is not to be frozen according to the framers' intent;
rather "the words of the text are given a meaning that seems natural to
contemporary eyes, not a meaning that has been distilled from historical
records extrinsic to the actual text. '56 In a sense, the interpretation begins
with the text, but then asserts that the framers would have advocated an
interpretation in accordance with contemporary values, had they been in
the contemporary setting.
e. The Canadian Approach Illustrated
An oft-cited example of the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of the
authority of the original drafters is Reference Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act.57
Here, the Court considered various sources that might indicate what the
original framers intended the term "fundamental justice" to mean, includ-
ing proceedings from the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution and
the Canadian Bill of Rights. Lamer J. rejected an approach to interpreta-
tion that would privilege an "original" intent over one that would permit
for change and development:
Another danger with casting the interpretation of s. 7 in terms of the
comments made by those heard at the Special Joint Committee Proceed-
ings is that, in so doing, the rights, freedoms and values embodied in the
Charter in effect become frozen in time to the moment of adoption with
little or no possibility of growth, development and adjustment to chang-
53. Manfredi, supra note 29 at 43. Manfred is outlining Monahan's argument from Patrick Monahan,
Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme Court of Canada (Agincourt,
Ont.: Carswell, 1987).
54. Hogg, supra note 27 at 97. The metaphor of frozen language seems aptly rejected by Canadians
who spend enough of their time frozen in other ways.
55. Ibid. at 101 [emphasis in original].
56. Ibid. at 102.
57. Supra note 2.
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ing societal needs. Obviously, in the present case, given the proximity in
time of the Charter debates, such a problem is relatively minor, even
though it must be noted that even at this early stage in the life of the
Charter, a host of issues and questions have been raised which were
largely unforeseen at the time of such proceedings. If the newly planted
"living tree" which is the Charter is to have the possibility of growth
and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that historical
materials, such as the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Spe-
cial Joint Committee, do not stunt its growth.58
Lamer J.'s observation about the "unforeseen" arising is significant,
because it points to how the Constitution as much as anything is a docu-
ment that must be useful to those who would sort out the legality of new
events or the Constitutionality of new laws. In effect, interpreters take a
view of the past's documents so that they can also make sense of their own
present circumstances: they interpret the past and the present simulta-
neously. The "unforeseen" always arises, and the Constitution must recog-
nize this inevitability and deal with it.
Lamer J.'s view in Reference Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act of the inter-
pretive authority of the Bill ofRights is interesting as well. He notes, citing
Le Dain J. in R. v. Therens:
In my opinion the premise that the framers of the Charter must be pre-
sumed to have intended that the words used by it should be given the
meaning which had been given to them by judicial decisions at the time
the Charter was enacted is not a reliable guide to its interpretation and
application. By its very nature a constitutional charter of rights and free-
doms must use general language which is capable of development and
adaptation by the courts.59
Lamer J. goes on to further cite Le Dain J., who notes that while in
some instances, "the framers of the Charter adopted the wording of the
Canadian Bill ofRights, it is also clear that the Charter must be regarded,
because of its constitutional character, as a new affirmation of rights and
freedoms and of judicial power and responsibility in relation to their pro-
tection." 60 This comment reflects the necessity of ensuring that if, in inter-
preting a constitutional document, any recourse is made to sources that
58. Ibid. at 509.
59. Ibid. at 510, citing R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 at 638, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 655 [emphasis
added].
60. Ibid.[emphasis added].
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might guide views of an "intent," interpreters must ensure that the source
they turn to is itself a legitimate one. The Court thus questions and rejects
the possible guiding intention of the Bill of Rights precisely "because it
did not reflect a clear constitutional mandate to make judicial decisions
having the effect of limiting or qualifying the traditional sovereignty of
Parliament."
61
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Vriend v. Alberta
62
provides an example of the Court's consideration of its role in declaring
legislative provisions constitutionally invalid. Cory J. states that the Court
is guided in its interpretations by the Constitution itself, and the values
that it enshrines. In this judgment, Cory J. writes at length about the pur-
pose of judicial review under the Charter, noting that "hardly a day goes
by without some comment or criticism to the effect that under the Charter
courts are wrongfully usurping the role of the legislatures. '63 He cites
commentary that declares judicial review to be "illegitimate because it is
anti-democratic in that unelected officials (judges) are overruling elected
representatives (legislators)."' His response seems to advocate a "middle
path" where theories of interpretation are concerned, paying attention to
the intent of original drafters who put the Court in charge of constitutional
enforcement, 65 but not confining interpretation beyond the intent to
endorse judicial review. Rather than positing a purely noninterpretivist
role, Cory J. rejects the notion that the judiciary makes "value judgments"
about policy; instead, he argues that the judiciary upholds the Constitution
as the Constitution directs, 66 which makes government and the Courts
accountable to each other.67 In making this argument, Cory J. argues
importantly that interpretation must heed values besides those enumerated
in the constitutional text, such as "the concept of democracy," which is
"broader than the notion of majority rule, fundamental as that may be,
' 68
and Charter values: "respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide vari-
ety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social
and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals
and groups in society."69 To decide without accounting for democratic
61. Ibid.
62. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
63. Ibid. at para.130.
64. Ibid. at para.133.
65. Ibid. at para.134.
66. Ibid. at para.136.
67. Ibid. at para.139.
68. Ibid. at para.140.
69. Ibid., citing Dickson C.J. in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 136, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200.
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values, Cory J. argues, is to act undemocratically.70
Major J. dissents in terms of the remedy the Court provides to a finding
of unconstitutionality. The majority judgment indicated that the remedy
would be to read sexual orientation into Alberta's human rights statute as a
protected ground; the minority judgment would have remedied the uncon-
stitutionality by a declaration of invalidity for a period of a year. Major J.
voices some of the concerns I have cited above about judicial activism
because of the clear opposition of the Alberta legislature to including sexual
orientation in its human rights legislation. Major J.'s decision regarding
the appropriate remedy seems to be guided by the Charter values articu-
lated by Cory J., in that he does not disagree with the section 15 or section
1 analyses of the majority, but he is also guided by the intention of the
framers of the legislation under scrutiny, and he therefore declines to make
assumptions in determining an appropriate remedy about what the legisla-
tors would have done.7' He would thus leave it to the legislature to deter-
mine how to remedy its Charter breach because "[t]hey are answerable to
the electorate of that province and it is for them to choose the remedy
whether it is changing the legislation or using the notwithstanding clause.
That decision in turn will be judged by the voters."72 He writes:
The responsibility of enacting legislation that accords with the rights
guaranteed by the Charter rests with the legislature. Except in the clearest
of cases, courts should not dictate how underinclusive legislation must
be amended. Obviously, the courts have a role to play in protecting
Charter rights by deciding on the constitutionality of legislation. Defer-
ence and respect for the role of the legislature come into play in deter-
mining how unconstitutional legislation will be amended where various
means are available.
73
This decision and the other commentary I have cited suggest that
Canadian judicial review has predominantly, if not exclusively, rejected as
its main source of constitutional authority the words of the constitutional
text as they might have been intended by the original authors. Rather, in
matters of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court of Canada has
tended to follow its pronouncement in Hunter v. Southam, that "[a] consti-
tution ... is drafted with an eye to the future ... Once enacted, its provi-
sions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable
70. Ibid. at para. 142.
71. Ibid. atpara.195.
72. Ibid. atpara.197.
73. Ibid. at para.198.
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of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and
historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the
guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear
these considerations in mind. '74 This rejection of original intent can, as I
argue below, be seen as an important element of the discursive approach to
constitutional interpretation and amendment that I discuss further, because
it opens up interpretive possibilities rather than limits them to a textual
basis.
II. Foucault and Authorship
So far, this discussion has tended to focus on authorship as a function of
who the individuals are who write and interpret: are they original drafters,
or judges? Should judges interpret or originate? Do original authors have
authority over us because of their identity, or because we pay homage to
their historical moment and the process they engaged in? Despite the
discussion's having considered how texts may change meaning over time,
the idea of authorship discussed so far (and that discussed in much com-
mentary on constitutional authorship) is strongly rooted in a
conceptualization of the author as an individualperson or group of people.
For example, Lamer J.'s judgment in Reference Re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act
perceives of authorship, if original intent is even to be considered, as a
process participated in by multiple people rather than individuals:
Moreover, the simple fact remains that the Charter is not the product of
a few individual public servants, however distinguished, but of a multi-
plicity of individuals who played major roles in the negotiating, drafting
and adoption of the Charter. How can one say with any confidence that
within this enormous multiplicity of actors, without forgetting the role
of the provinces, the comments of a few federal civil servants can in any
way be determinative?75
A potential alternative theoretical framework in which to consider is-
sues of authorship in the context of constitutional interpretation is Michel
Foucault's "What is an Author?" 76 Here, Foucault explores the "singular
74. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641. One could understand the metaphorical descrip-
tion of the Constitution as a "living tree" in Edwards v. Canada (A.G.) (1929), [1930] A.C. 124 at 136,
[1929] All E.R. Rep. 571 (PC.) as another form of this interest in treating the Constitution as adaptable.
75. Supra note 2 at 508 [emphasis added].
76. Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" in Hazard Adams & Leroy Searle, eds., Critical Theory
Since 1965 (Tallahassee: Florida State University Presses, 1986) 138.
Amending Authors and Constitutional Discourse
relationship that holds between an author and a text, the manner in which
a text apparently points to this figure who is outside and precedes it."
'77
Foucault offers three propositions: first, the term "author" is a special des-
ignation reserved for some types of texts; second, that there is an "author
function" related to the realm of discourse; and third, that there are
"transdiscursive" authors.
In the first part of the essay, Foucault discusses how a writer's proper
name "moves from the interior of a discourse to the real person outside
who produced it,"7 but an author's name encompasses more than this:
An author's name is not simply an element of speech (as a subject,
complement, or an element that could be replaced by a pronoun or other
parts of speech). Its presence is functional in that it serves as a means of
classification. A name can group together a number of texts and thus
differentiate them from others. A name also establishes different forms
of relationships among texts.
79
In adapting this idea to constitutional theory, I would suggest that when
we speak of the origins of constitutional texts, we mean more than proper-
named persons; we refer to people who serve as designates of a population
and who write foundational documents according to procedures and val-
ues, so that constitutional texts are classified as distinct from other types
of texts and give rise to and delimit other texts, such as ordinary legisla-
tion.
This special authorial status for Foucault distinguishes discourse from
mere text: "Discourse that possesses an author's name is not to be immedi-
ately consumed and forgotten; neither is it accorded the momentary atten-
tion given to ordinary, fleeting words. Rather, its status and its manner of
reception are regulated by the culture in which it circulates."8 Constitu-
tional discourse has these qualities: it is foundational, and the interpretive
strategies of governmental and judicial institutions serve to regulate its
status and reception. Thus, to take a Foucauldian view, the author function
in constitutional discourse elevates it to a significant cultural and social
position.
77. Ibid. at 139.
78. Ibid. at 142.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
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Foucault states that the author function is
not formed spontaneously through the simple attribution of a discourse
to an individual. It results from a complex operation whose purpose is
to construct the rational entity we call an author ... these aspects of an
individual, which we designate as an author (or which comprise an indi-
vidual as an author), are projections, in terms always more or less psy-
chological, of our way of handling texts: in the comparisons we make,
the traits we extract as pertinent, the continuities we assign, or the exclu-
sions we practice.81
This rings true with the construction of constitutional authorship: in-
terpretive strategies project onto authors, traits and continuities that we
"extract as pertinent" such as deliberativeness, representativeness, or a
controlling intent. According to Young, we also designate authors through
the exclusions we practice, valuing some constitutional actors more than
others, and at times accepting exclusive configurations of authors.82
Foucault also describes a subset of "transdiscursive" authors, which I
would suggest accurately describes original authors. These authors make
a "distinctive contribution ... in that they produced not only their own work,
but the possibility and the rules of formation of other texts."83 The
transdiscursive author is one who "cleared a space for the introduction of
elements other than their own, which, nevertheless, remain within the field
of discourse they initiated."84 The "initiation of a discursive practice" for
Foucault is "heterogeneous to its ulterior transformations." 85 Foucault's
point, I think, is that a special category of authors produce works that in-
vite the establishment of other texts; in the constitutional context, original
framers are "transdiscursive" because they produce the seminal text that
in turn prompts other texts (for instance, legislation and judicial decisions)
and other commentary and debate (for instance, legislative debate). This
initiative work is heterogeneous because it spans the multiple responses,
but yet remains distinct from them, never to be confused with "mere" leg-
islation, for example.
For Foucault, the discourse of transdiscursive authors gives rise to a
"return" by others to an "act of initiation" because of some absence in the
original that is "not the result of accident or incomprehension." An act of
initiation is an act of original composition:
81. Ibid. at 143.
82. See generally Young, supra note 23.
83. Supra note 76 at 145.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid. at 146.
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In effect, the act of initiation is such, in its essence, that it is inevitably
subjected to its own distortions; that which displays this act and derives
from it is, at the same time, the root of its divergences and travesties.
This nonaccidental omission must be regulated by precise operations
that can be situated, analysed, and reduced in a return to the act of initia-
tion ... In addition, it is always a return to a text in itself, specifically, to
a primary and unadorned text with particular attention to those things
registered in the interstices of the text, its gaps and absences. We return
to those empty spaces that have been masked by omission or concealed
in a false and misleading plenitude. In these rediscoveries of an essen-
tial lack, we find the oscillation of two characteristic responses: "This
point was made - you can't help seeing it if you know how to read"; or,
inversely, "No, that point is not made in any of the printed words in the
text, but it is expressed through the words, in their relationships and in
the distance that separates them." It follows naturally that this return,
which is a part of the discursive mechanism, constantly introduces modi-
fications and that the return to a text is not a historical supplement that
would come to fix itself upon the primary discursivity and redouble it in
the form of an ornament, which, after all, is not essential. Rather, it is an
effective and necessary means of transforming discursive practice ...
A last feature of these returns is that they tend to reinforce the enig-
matic link between an author and his works. A text has an inaugurative
value precisely because it is the work of a particular author, and our
returns are conditioned by this knowledge.86
For many constitutional legal theorists, the constitutional text has
inaugurative value because of the nature of the original authors, who cre-
ate the possibility of and rules of formation of other constitutional texts.
They set the framework for a country's future constitutional nature. They
also create the circumstances of their own interpretation.
All constitutional interpretation may be a version of what Foucault
describes as the act of "return," and I would suggest that Foucault's notion
of the return is particularly apt for constitutional amendments. Foucault
describes the "return" to be the result of a "basic and constructive omis-
sion, an omission that is not the result of accident or incomprehension."87
It is clear that the very nature of constitutional documents means that by
definition, they cannot provide for the substance of their own amendment
but only the procedure,"t and as such, omissions that are later addressed by
86. Ibid. at 146-47.
87. Ibid. at 146.
88. There are countries, such as Germany, that restrict the substance of constitutional amendments.
See infra note 91 at 279. Other countries, as did Canada until recently, may not provide for amendment
at all.
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amendment are not the result of accident or incomprehension. To predict
how a nation will wish to change in the future leads to the inevitable ques-
tion about why such and such a change is not simply incorporated into the
existing document at the time. As the Supreme Court of Canada notes in
the Reference Re Amendment of Constitution of Canada, "[w]e are involved
here with a finishing operation, with fitting a piece into the constitutional
edifice; it is idle to expect to find anything in the British North America
Act that regulates the process that has been initiated in this case."8 9
In providing for an amending formula, constitutions save future gen-
erations from being forever bound to past generations' substantive, if not
procedural will, yet change is provided for by a process rather than by
accident. Thus, constitutions are "subjected to their own distortions."
Constitutional amendments are not, however, wholesale "acts of
initiation." By establishing the link between the "return" and the initial
discourse, Foucault's view of interpretation coincides with the commen-
tary of writers who argue for fundamentally unamendable constitutional
values which, if altered, to use Foucault's language, would constitute
initiations rather than returns. For an amending "return" to be legitimate,
it must originate somehow with the "unadorned" text itself, but Foucault's
analysis of the act of return and his emphasis on discourse registers the
notion that the text is both presence and absence, it has "interstices of the
text ... gaps and absences." The act of return fills the gaps, but does so
from within the discourse that establishes it. In the act of return, then, the
new "text is not a historical supplement that would come to fix itself upon
the primary discursivity and redouble it in the form of an ornament, which,
after all, is not essential. Rather, it is an effective and necessary means of
transforming discursive practice." Constitutional amendments perform this
same function: they do not supplement or ornament the constitutional text,
but become part of the constitutional discourse. Foucault's view of
authorship thus is useful to constitutional legal theory because he recog-
nizes both the value and status of the author, but also that authors and
discourse emerge together. At the same time, he recognizes that discourses
inevitably change because they are inevitably incomplete; change is not,
however, decontextualized but is driven by the text and the discourse
itself, which those who perform the act of "return" must articulate and
recognize, so that an amending return is never severed from the initiating
moment but is conditioned by the original circumstances, values, and authors.
89. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 743 at 799, 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1 [Patriation Reference cited to S.C.R.].
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III. Ideas ofAuthorship and Constitutional Amendments
The issue of authorship is important not only to constitutions, but to the
process of constitutional amendment because constitutions often articu-
late who or what types of author can be amending authors, and according
to what procedures. This puts amending authors in a different temporal
space from original authors, and also provides a different basis for their
existence. While original authors are constructed by historical moments
and processes, amending authors are usually constructed by the constitu-
tions themselves. The former precede text, in a particular time and place;
the latter emergefrom text. With a constitution in place, the legitimacy of
the amending author can be more readily scrutinized as well, because the
stakes of finding them illegitimate are substantially less than a finding that
original authors are illegitimate; the former problem means an amendment
is dismissed, the latter that an entire constitutional order is questioned.
Amending authors are in an unusual position as well, because for rea-
sons of stability, they cannot be too ready to rewrite. Constitutions should
provide for amendment but yet avoid change that is too easy, which would
undermine constitutional stability. Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein
write about the important ways that constitutional amendments character-
ize a nation:
The form taken by the amending power, in other words, sheds light on
the variety of theories underlying different liberal democracies. It helps
us identify the broad norms and basic commitments behind the constitu-
tional fine print. It helps explain how various framers conceived the
relationship between procedure and substance, for instance, or the dis-
tinction between the core and the periphery of the constitutional order.
In the American case, the amending power builds upon a democratic
conception of popular sovereignty, of the authorizing democratic will
that stands above the constitution and is able to change it in toto. This
idea fits well with the self-conscious American revision of the English
understanding of sovereignty. The German Constitution, while gesturing
in the direction of popular sovereignty, declares many provisions un-
amendable, allowing the unelected court effectively to block certain at-
tempts by the elected branches to change the constitution.9"
90. Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, "The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe"
in Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional
Amendment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) 275 at 278-79. For other sources on Ameri-
can constitutional amendment, see Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome Agel, Amending America: if we
love the Constitution so much why do we keep tying to change it? (New York: Times Books, 1993) and
the work of J.R. Vile.
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For some theorists, the designation by a constitution of who can author
amendments may represent, in fact, a limit on the self-determination of a
populace, if only certain authors can rewrite and especially if a constitu-
tion insulates certain values from the amending process (for example, Ar-
ticle 79 of the German Constitution prevents amendment to the
constitution's basic principles of human rights91). The corresponding fear,
however, is that over-valuing self-determination can construct amending
authors as a function of majority rule, which threatens the continuation of
other values such as respect for minority rights. If any provision is amend-
able, then "amendability suggests, to put it crudely, that basic rights are
ultimately at the mercy of interest-group politics, if some arbitrary elec-
toral threshold is surpassed and amenders play by the book."92 For Holmes
and Sunstein, a constitutional amending formula that is mainly process-
oriented may "imply the triumph of procedure over substance" 93 while a
different formula such as that of Germany may "entrench certain rights in
the sense that it places them beyond not only politics, but even the kind of
revision represented by constitutional amendment." 94 Walter F. Murphy
has posited that the theories of democracy and constitutionalism are mutu-
ally modifying, so that even a democratic, procedurally correct movement
to amend the American constitution according to its amending formula
could be considered unconstitutional if it violated fundamental human rights
by removing, for example, the protection of racial equality: this would
"repudiate ... the system itself and substitute another system grounded
solely on majority rule." 95 (An interesting point, as constitutionally en-
trenched racial inclusion itself only came about over time and through
political and constitutional change.) Or seen another way, there "are prin-
ciples above the literal terms of the constitutional document" that, if de-
nied, would mean the "basic purposes of the whole constitutional system" 96
are undermined. This would not, of course, prevent a society of people
who so desired to use force, for instance, to reject entirely constitutional
provisions that uphold fundamental human rights; Murphy's point is that
in so doing, the constitution itself is nonetheless violated and the change
would not in itself be constitutional.
91. Axel Tschentscher, ed., The Basic Law (Grundgesetz): The Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Germany (May 23rd, 1949) (Wuirzburg: Jurisprudentia Verlag, 2002) at 59.
92. Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 90 at 278.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Walter E Murphy, "An Ordering of Constitutional Values" (1980) 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 703 at 757.
96. Ibid.
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Another consideration regarding constitutional amendments is whether
there is only one source that directs how amendments can be made. For
example, in the American context, some authors suggest that the only valid
constitutional amendments are those that accord with the amending for-
mula in the American constitution, Article V.97 Others, such as Bruce
Ackerman, suggest that the constitution is amended not only by the formal
amendment procedure, but whenever "constitutional politics" allow for
"mobilized popular consent to new constitutional solutions.""8 He thus
rejects the notion that the only way to amend the American constitution is
through the Article V provision and instead takes a "pluralistic reading of
the Founding text"99 that understands "the rules for amendment laid down
in 1787 as facilitative devices, which remain available when the American
People choose to use them. But [denies] ... that these rules exhaust the
repertoire of legitimate techniques for constitutional revision. ' Akhil R.
Amar proposes similarly that Article V binds how government may change
the constitution, but "nowhere prevents the People themselves, acting apart
from ordinary government, from exercising their legal right to alter or abol-
ish government, via the proper legal procedures,"'01 in which he would
include exposure to and engagement with opposed ideas, where "the ma-
jority should attempt to reason with and persuade dissenters, and vice versa"
so there is a "deliberate majority of the collective 'People,' not a mere
mathematical concatenation of atomized 'persons."" 0 2  Both Amar and
Ackerman thus seem to distinguish between formal constitutional amend-
ment, and the recognition that political climates that interpret the constitu-
tion are always changing, and thus the lack of any particular, formal amend-
ments does not mean a country or polis does not change.
As a Canadian Federal Government Discussion Paper indicates, the
procedure for amending a federal constitution is tricky: "the constitution
must ... provide for the distribution of powers between the central and
regional governments" and therefore "the procedure for amending the con-
stitution [must] be structured so that matters of fundamental concern to the
constituent parts cannot be altered without appropriate support from those
97. See David R. Dow, "The Plain Meaning of Article V" in Levinson, supra note 90, 117; and in the
Canadian context, see Jeremy Webber, "The Legality of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence
under Canadian Law" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 281.
98. Bruce A. Ackerman, We The People, vol. 1, Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1991) at 31.
99. Bruce Ackerman, "Higher Lawmaking" in Levinson, supra note 90, 63 at 73.
100. Ibid. at 74.
101. Akhil Reed Amar, "Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment" in Levinson, supra note
90, 89 at 90 [emphasis in original].
102. Ibid. at 110.
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parts."' 3 The amending process must therefore be difficult, but if it is too
difficult, the constitution cannot adapt to changing circumstances.
What is the Canadian position on constitutional amendments? Com-
mentators have noted the lack of sustained Canadian discourse on the
issue,' 0 4 perhaps explained by there being only twenty years of a national
amending formula. Not presuming to fill the gap but rather to contribute to
the conversation, I suggest that in four relatively recent Supreme Court of
Canada decisions on constitutional amendments, the Supreme Court
counters its own trend, noted above, of rejecting original intent, initially
by relying on original intent as a guiding force for how the Court is to
approach the issue of constitutional amendment. The Court also builds
upon the intent of the original authors by identifying federalism and
regional representation as paramount determinants of which parties can
rewrite the constitution and by what processes. However, more recently,
the Court has taken a discursive view of authorship, identifying amending
authors as being constructed from a discourse. In this most recent view of
authorship, I suggest that in Canada, a Foucauldian notion of amending
authorship being a function of discourse has emerged, which allows for a
view of constitutional amendment in Canada that newly emphasizes the
political participation of the citizens of Canada who, as a nation and with
a history, direct their own constitutional order.
1. The Senate Reference
The Canadian Constitution, until 1982, lacked the capacity for self-amend-
ment in matters fundamental to the country's federal character. This was a
role reserved for the parliament of the United Kingdom. As Peter H. Russell
writes, this lack was a sign of "profoundly incomplete" nation building-
"so long as it was necessary to traipse over to England to have its Consti-
tution amended, Canada appeared to be less than a fully mature member of
the international community" which was the subject of "embarrassment."'0 5
This legal incapacity however, to "do it oneself," did not mean that the
Canadian constitution remained unamended, even by the initiative of
Canadian governments. The Canadian constitution has been amended many
103. Canada, Amending the Constitution of Canada: A Discussion Paper (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Services Canada, 1990) at 1.
104. Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, "Constitutional Theory and The Quebec Secession Reference"
(2000) 13 Can. J.L. & Juris. 143 at para.3. This article discusses the Supreme Court of Canada's re-
course to normative law and politics and provides an excellent survey of theories of constitutional law
in a Canadian context.
105. Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?, 2d ed.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) at 57.
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times but, as the Supreme Court of Canada judgments on amendments
indicate, these amendments tended to be overwhelmingly by the consent
of the relevant levels of government rather than by reason of a bold asser-
tion of capability by the amending party.
In Reference Re Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada in
Relation to the Upper House,"6 the Court was asked to construe the mean-
ing of section 91 (1) of the British North America Act,107 and specifically to
determine if there was federal legislative authority to abolish the Upper
House or Senate. Section 91(1), now repealed, was a 1949 amendment to
the constitution which gave the federal government unilateral amending
power regarding the constitution, save power to amend anything
exclusively within provincial power, denominational school rights, and
the official use of English and French in federal, Manitoba, and Quebec
institutions. The amendment also protected the requirement that
Parliament meet once a year, and the five year term limit to the House of
Commons.108
In this decision, the Court reviews a much-cited 1965 White Paper of
Hon. Guy Favreau, the Minister of Justice, which identified four principles
of Canadian constitutional amendment: the request must be formally made
by Canada, Parliament (the House of Commons and the Senate) had to
make the request, no Province alone could request amendment, but a
request had to come via the federal government representing all of Canada,
and, where amendments would affect federal/provincial relationships, the
Provinces would be consulted and their agreement sought.
The Court's decision clarifies that, unlike prior amendments legally
enacted under section 91(1), "[t]he legislation contemplated [here] ...
[w]hile it does not directly affect federal-provincial relationships in the
sense of changing federal and provincial legislative powers, it does envis-
age the elimination of one of the two Houses of Parliament, and so would
alter the structure of the federal Parliament to which the federal power to
legislate is entrusted under s. 91 of the Act."'0 9 This characterization of the
question makes the issue of authorship central: the proposed amendment
would fundamentally change the identity of the governmental actor that
could legislate under s.91, transforming it from a dual body of House and
Senate to a single body of House only.
While this transformation is not anti-democratic in that it would main-
106. (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54, 102 D.L.R. (3d) 1 [Senate Reference cited to S.C.R.].
107. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
108. Russell, supra note 105 at 66-67.
109. Senate Reference, supra note 106 at 55.
242 The Dalhousie Law Journal
tain the body of elected representatives as a governing power, the Court
indicates that such a transformation would violate the intent of the original
authors of the constitution. The Court states:
It is, we think, proper to consider the historical background which led to
the provision which was made in the Act for the creation of the Senate as
a part of the apparatus for the enactment of federal legislation. In the
debates which occurred at the Quebec Conference in 1864, considerable
time was occupied in discussing the provisions respecting the Senate. Its
important purpose is stated in ... speeches delivered in the debates on
Confederation in the parliament of the province of Canada.'
The Court then quotes statements made during parliamentary debate
by Sir John A. Macdonald and the Honourable George Brown, both of
whom identify the Senate as an instrument protecting regional interests
and minorities that might be overcome by House majorities. According to
Brown, "the very essence of our compact is that the union shall be federal
and not legislative. Our Lower Canada friends have agreed to give us rep-
resentation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition
that they shall have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition
could we have advanced a step."'II
In this decision, the Court declares two fundamental characteristics of
an amending author in Canada, based largely on original intent and re-
course to the text, namely the Preamble, which identifies that the original
parties to the constitution were Canadian provinces: "Whereas the Prov-
inces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their
Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar
in Principle to that of the United Kingdom.""1 2 First, the Court points out
that the proposal before it would have changed the identity of the federal
government. Because under s. 91 (1) this federal body had constitutional
amending power, albeit constrained, the Court's decision declares that an
amending author must be not only a democratically elected body, but also
accommodate regional representation, which is what the Senate provides
in Parliament. The "who" to amend the constitution, according to the
Senate Reference, can thus be the federal parliament for a limited range of
substantive changes to the constitution, but this federal body must repre-
sent the entire country and not only a majority of it.
110. Ibid. at 66.
111. Ibid. at 67.
112. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 107.
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Second, the Court establishes that, in addition to the federal amending
author including democratically elected and regionally representative
agents, the amending author in practice has always been both the federal
and provincial governments. This is more than merely a comment on amend-
ing procedure requiring consultation, because the Court refers to the inter-
est in provincial "agreement" or "consenf' as well as consultation.'" This
is drawn from the Favreau paper as well as historical precedent:
The practice, since 1875, has been to seek amendment of the [BNA, 1867]
Act by a joint address of both Houses of Parliament. Consultation with
one or more of the provinces has occurred in some instances. The amend-
ment in 1907 was based on resolutions passed at provincial conferences,
although opposed by British Columbia. The 1930 amendment respect-
ing the transfer of resources to the four western provinces resulted from
agreements with those provinces. The 1949 amendment respecting New-
foundland becoming a province was made after there had been an agree-
ment with that province. The amendments of 1940, 195 1, 1960 and 1964,
respecting unemployment insurance, old age pensions, the compulsory
retirement of judges and adding supplementary benefits to old age pen-
sions all had the unanimous consent of the provinces.'1 4
This decision is largely based on textual interpretation and original
intent, but the Court also in effect constructs as original authors Canadian
provinces, regional interests, and federally elected officials. This is im-
portant because by constructing regional bodies as original authors, re-
gions more so than people become determinant, which I would argue em-
phasizes federalism and Canada as a union of distinct bodies as the dis-
course that pervades subsequent decisions. In this respect, the Court seems
to confirm a view of Canada that Reginald Whitaker criticizes:
the constitution of Canada has been, from 1867 onward, an arrangement
between elites, particularly between political elites ... The British North
America Act of 1867 was ... almost entirely innocent of any recognition
of the people as the object of the Constitutional exercise ...
The British North America Act ignored individual Canadians,
except as they qualified through membership in a church or a language
group. The BNA Act was itself never submitted to a popular referendum
113. The requirement for both consultation and consent provides an interesting foil to the requirement
for consultation that governs the Federal/Aboriginal relationship as per Delgamuukw v. British Colum-
bia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193. See also Richard Devlin & Ronalda Murphy,
"Contextualizing the Duty to Consult: Clarification or Transformation?" (2003) 14 N.J.C.L. 167.
114. Senate Reference, supra note 106 at 63-64.
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for ratification ... But to make matters worse, almost all of the commen-
tary - whether political, judicial, or academic - on the nature and re-
form of the Constitution has tended to ignore the question of the relation
of people to government, or of people to each other, in favour of persis-
tent attention to the relation of government to government, or of Crown
to parliament, or of Canada to the British Parliament." 5
2. The Patriation Reference
In 1981, in the thick of the debate about constitutional amendment and
patriation in Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada again heard a
reference question 16 coming to it from the appellate courts of Manitoba,
Newfoundland, and Quebec regarding the October 1980 proposal that would
be considered by the House of Commons and Senate.This proposal
included a Resolution to be put before the United Kingdom Parliament
regarding the BNA Act, 1867, which would patriate the Canadian constitu-
tion and add to it a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and an amending
formula. Only Ontario and New Brunswick supported it. The position of
the contesting provinces was that because the Resolution would affect fed-
eral/provincial relations (the Charter, for example, could curtail enactments
by provincial legislatures), the federal government could not make such a
Resolution without the consent of some and possibly all provincial
legislatures.
This decision includes four separate reasons and two majorities, one
on the legality of unilateral action by the federal government, the other on
how constitutional conventions affect how the federal government can act.
I refer to the former as the "majority legality judgment" and the latter as
the "majority convention judgment." As the majority legality judgment
notes, similar to the abolition of the Senate, this Resolution would not
change the federal structure of Canada ("the essential federal character of
the country is preserved under the enactments proposed by the Resolu-
tion"" 7) but it does concern who or what body could propose such a change
to the United Kingdom and what is the process for doing so.
At the same time that the majority legality judgment recognizes an
inability of self-amendment in Canada, which "suffers from an internal
deficiency in the absence of legal power to alter or amend the essential
distributive arrangements under which legal authority is exercised in the
115. Reginald Whitaker, "Democracy and the Canadian Constitution" in Keith G. Banting & Richard
Simeon, eds., And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto:
Methuen, 1983) 240 at 240-41.
116. Patriation Reference, supra note 89.
117. Ibid. at 807.
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country, whether at the federal or provincial level,"" "the Court recognizes
that it has no authority to state how the United Kingdom parliament can
act: "The legal competence of [the United Kingdom] ... Parliament ...
remains unimpaired, and it is for it alone to determine if and how it will
act." l 9 The conclusion of the majority legality judgment on the legal re-
quirement for provincial consultation is that there is no textual support for
or against the power of the federal government to make a Resolution to the
British parliament: "the British North America Act itself is silent on the
question of the power of the federal Houses to proceed by resolution to
procure an amendment to the Act by an address to Her Majesty."' 20 While
the majority legality decision references debate in the United Kingdom
regarding the Unemployment Insurance constitutional amendment of 1940,
which notes that provincial consent is desirable, it confirms that desirabil-
ity is not paramount to a legal requirement.
In the majority legality judgment, the distinction between a legal re-
quirement and a practical or desirable requirement is emphasized. This
emphasis seems to encourage the Justices to take a very "interpretivist"'
12
1
approach to the issue before them, focussing on statutory construction and
rejecting evidence of historical debate and "theories":
The arguments from history do not lead to any consistent view or
any single view of the nature of the British North America Act;
selective interpretations are open and have been made; see Report
of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations...
History cannot alter the fact that in law there is a British statute to
construe and apply in relation to a matter, fundamental as it is, that
is not provided for by the statute. Practices which took account of
evolving Canadian independence, did, of course, develop. They
had both intra-Canadian and extra-Canadian aspects in relation to
British legislative authority ... Theories, whether of a full compact
theory (which, even factually, cannot be sustained, having regard
to federal power to create new provinces out of federal territories,
which was exercised in the creation of Alberta and Saskatchewan)
or of a modified compact theory, as urged by some of the prov-
inces, operate in the political realm, in political science studies.
118. Ibid. at 774.
119. Ibid. at 799.
120. Ibid. at 803.
121. See Part 1.3.b., above. The "interpretivist" approach, counterintuitively, privileges the original
intent and not the views of the particular interpreter.
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They do not engage the law, save as they might have some periph-
eral relevance to actual provisions of the British North America
Act and its interpretation and application.
... [T]here is nothing in the reference to theories of federalism
reflected in some case law that goes beyond their use as an aid to
a justiciable question raised apart from them.1
22
On a legal basis, the Court confirms that the identity of amending au-
thors is provided for strictly in the text. This is not, however, the end of
the inquiry, as it might be for an "interpretivist" Court.
Members of the Court also issued a majority judgment regarding con-
stitutional conventions and their influence on constitutional amendments.
While Russell refers to this as the Court speaking "with a forked tongue,'
'2
and quotes Prime Minister Trudeau's view that the justices "'blatantly
manipulated the evidence before them so as to arrive at the desired re-
suit,"'"24 I suggest that in its discussion of convention, the Court moves
towards a discursive view of authorship, indicating that in matters of con-
stitutional amendment, legitimacy can be as important as legality, and con-
stitutionality is a matter of both. Where amending authors are concerned,
the majority convention judgment takes a Foucauldian view of authorship,
allowing Canadian constitutional discourse (made up of many statements
and principles rather than just the text) to construct legitimate amending
authors, unlike the Senate Reference, which takes an "interpretivist" ap-
proach to amendments.
The judgment of Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz, Chouinard and
Lamer JJ. is the majority opinion in the matter of constitutional conven-
tions. Like Laskin C.J., Estey J. and McIntyre J. who wrote a minority
convention judgment, these Justices signal their noninterpretive approach
when they observe that constitutional authority in Canada is not confined
to a text:
But many Canadians would perhaps be surprised to learn that important
parts of the constitution of Canada, with which they are the most famil-
iar because they are directly involved when they exercise their right to
vote at federal and provincial elections, are nowhere to be found in the
law of the constitution. 1
25
122. Patriation Reference, supra note 89 at 803-04.
123. Russell, supra note 105 at 118.
124. Ibid. at 119.
125. Patriation Reference, supra note 89 at 877-78.
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In addition to the text are constitutional conventions that, while not
enforceable by Courts, serve "to ensure that the legal framework of the
constitution will be operated in accordance with the prevailing constitu-
tional values or principles of the period" 2 6 and concern such things as the
"democratic principle" or the independence of former British colonies.
The majority convention decision differs from the minority in a funda-
mental way: the former indicates that to violate a convention can be to act
unconstitutionally because
conventions may be more important than some laws. Their importance
depends on that of the value or principle which they are meant to safe-
guard. Also they form an integral part of the constitution and of the
constitutional system ... That is why it is perfectly appropriate to say
that to violate a convention is to do something which is
unconstitutional although it entails no direct legal consequence. But the
words "constitutional" and "unconstitutional" may also be used in a strict
legal sense, for instance with respect to a statute which is found ultra
vires or unconstitutional. The foregoing may perhaps be summarized in
an equation: constitutional conventions plus constitutional law equal the
total constitution of the country."7
This inclusion of convention into the discourse of what it means to act
constitutionally in Canada is highly significant, for it signals that, in rela-
tion to who or what body can be an amending author, it is a broader dis-
course rather than a text that is determinative.
However, in taking a discursive view of what it means to act constitu-
tionally, the majority convention judgment does not entirely forego re-
course to interpretivism: the judgment continues to seek a version of au-
thorial intention. The Justices establish three requirements for establish-
ing a convention; in addition to precedents and a reason for a rule, there
must be actors who manifest an intention to be bound by the precedential
rules. While these are not original authors in the usual sense understood
by interpretivism, the actors cited in this judgment are authors by implica-
tion, because their consent to constitutional amendment permitted them to
be passed and constitutional amendments that did not have this consent
were not passed. After reviewing prior amendments made to the BNA
Act, 1867, the Justices conclude that as a matter of convention, substantial
provincial consent is required for amendments that affect Canada's consti-
tutional division of powers. The judgment identifies the types of actors
126. Ibid. at 880
127. Ibid. at 883-84.
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that it will rely on in establishing constitutional conventions: they have to
be clothed with legitimacy. Thus, the judgment cites the amending prin-
ciples found in the Favreau White Paper of 1965, which it concludes are
important because of the identity of the writer and those who assented to
it: it was
circulated to all the provinces prior to its publication and had been found
satisfactory by all of them (see Commons Debates, 1965, at p. 11574,
and Background Paper published by the Government of Canada, The
Role of the United Kingdom in the Amendment of the Canadian Consti-
tution (March 1981), at p. 30). It was published as a white paper, that is
as an official statement of government policy, under the authority of the
federal Minister of Justice as member of a government responsible to
Parliament, neither House of which, so far as we know, has taken issue
with it. This statement is a recognition by all the actors in the precedents
that the requirement of provincial agreement is a constitutional rule.
28
The judgment also gives credence to the statements of ministers, states-
men, and Prime Ministers regarding the Unemployment Insurance amend-
ment and a Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1931 which articulated
the federal principles of Canadian political organization.
Interestingly, the judgment rejects statements that do not support the
conventions it upholds on the grounds that the objectors are not Ministers:
We were referred to an abundance of declarations made by Canadian
politicians on this issue. A few are unfavourable to the provincial posi-
tion but they were generally made by politicians such as Mr. J.T. Thorson
who were not ministers in office and could not be considered as "actors
in the precedents.'
29
This preference for high-level officials to members of parliament strikes
me as strange, because, in a similar fashion to the weight given the Favreau
White Paper, the Court seems to value statements by the executive branch
of the government of the day over those of elected representatives (i. e., the
legislative branch). In a sense, the Court's privileging of the executive
branch introduces an implicit emphasis on the will of the representatives
of the majority of Canadians. This implicit introduction of a majority-rule
principle into deliberations about authorship will be explicitly rejected in
the Secession Reference.3 °
128. Ibid. at 900.
129. Ibid. at 902.
130. See infra note 137.
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The conclusion of the majority convention judgment is that
[i]t would not be appropriate for the Court to devise in the abstract a
specific formula which would indicate in positive terms what measure
of provincial agreement is required for the convention to be complied
with. Conventions by their nature develop in the political field and it
will be for the political actors, not this Court, to determine the degree of
provincial consent required.
It is sufficient for the Court to decide that at least a substantial mea-
sure of provincial consent is required and to decide further whether the
situation before the Court meets with this requirement.13" '
This decision amounted to what Russell describes as a "legal green
light but a political red light." '132 Russell states that this prompted the fed-
eral government to then attempt to reach an agreement with the provinces,
despite having no legal requirement to do so. This is a significant com-
ment on the notion of amending authorship for it substantiates the perva-
siveness of the distinction between legality and legitimacy.
In reaching this decision, the Justices maintain a consideration of the
intention of prior actors in the area of constitutional amendment, but ex-
pand the sources that specify conditions for amending authorship to in-
clude constitutional conventions. The convention here is that consent is
required, which confirms the Senate Reference's finding that amending
authors in Canada had to include provincial bodies, in keeping with the
principle of federalism.
3. Quebec Veto Reference
In a second Reference decision in the early 1980s, Reference Re Amend-
ment of Canadian Constitution,3  the Supreme Court of Canada consid-
ered the force of constitutional conventions again as they relate to consti-
tutional amendments. The Constitution by this time had already been
patriated. The question before the Supreme Court of Canada was whether
by convention unanimous provincial consent was required before the Con-
stitution could be amended, and whether Quebec could veto constitutional
amendment-in other words, the question was whether Quebec must be
an amending author. The Court of Appeal of Quebec's decision on the
matter when the question was before it points to the necessity of legitimate
131. Patriation Reference, supra note 89 at 905.
132. Russell, supra note 105 at 119.
133. [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 140 D.L.R. (3d) 385 [Quebec Veto Reference cited to S.C.R.].
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authorship for constitutional amendments to be acceptable: the question
before it was, in fact, moot, but the Court of Appeal considered it nonethe-
less to explore the "legitimacy" if not the "legality" of the patriation pro-
cess." 134 In responding to the first question regarding unanimity, the Su-
preme Court of Canada followed the Patriation Reference which found
unanimity was not a requirement for constitutional amendment. With re-
gards to the second question, the Court determined that the appellant Que-
bec had not been able to demonstrate a convention of a Quebec veto be-
cause it could not establish "acceptance or recognition by the actors in the
precedents"' 35 of this convention.
This decision is interesting because it confirms the Court's view that
amending authors must be drawn from the country as a whole and repre-
sent the regions of the country, not just one province:
We have been referred to an abundance of material, speeches made in
the course of parliamentary debates, reports of royal commissions, opin-
ions of historians, political scientists, constitutional experts which en-
dorse in one way or another the principle of duality within the meaning
assigned to it by the appellant, and there can be no doubt that many
Canadian statesmen, politicians and experts favoured this principle.
But neither in his factum nor in oral argument did counsel for the
appellant quote a single statement made by any representative of the
federal authorities recognizing either explicitly or by necessary implica-
tion that Quebec had a conventional power of veto over certain types of
constitutional amendments. The statement made by Minister Favreau on
November 20, 1964, and the passage to be found at pp. 46 and 47 of the
White Paper have been quoted twice in the appellant's factum, as if they
supported the veto rule as well as the unanimity one, but they refer only
to unanimity and have been above dealt with in this respect.
Furthermore, a convention such as the one now asserted by Quebec
would have to be recognized by other provinces. We have not been re-
ferred to and we are not aware of any statement by the actors in any of
the other provinces acknowledging such a convention .... 116
The Court in these three decisions thus confirms one overriding prin-
ciple for constitutional amendment, and that is that the amending authors
must be representative of the nation as a whole, true to the federal prin-
ciple of Canadian government and the necessity upon which Confedera-
134. Ibid. at 799.
135.1 bid. at 814.
136. Ibid. at 814-15.
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tion itself was conditional, the protection of regional interests. Nonethe-
less, these authors remain conceptualized as governmental bodies rather
than as self-governing citizens who are separate from, but who do elect,
government representatives.
4. The Quebec Secession Reference
In Reference Re Secession of Quebec,3 ' the conditions for constitutional
amending authorship are widened even further, to encompass a wide con-
stitutional discourse and, I conclude, to inject into discussions about amend-
ing authors an acknowledgement of citizens as well as governments. An
explanation for the Court's moving away from a focus on the constitu-
tional text may be that the amending formula was explicit by now, the
Constitution Act, 1982 having been passed.'38
In the Secession Reference, the Court was again plunged into a topic
upon which the constitution is silent-secession-but the question of
whether Quebec could unilaterally secede from Canada implicitly asks if a
province can unilaterally alter the Canadian Constitution:
It is of course true that the Constitution is silent as to the ability of a
province to secede from Confederation but, although the Constitution
neither expressly authorizes nor prohibits secession, an act of secession
would purport to alter the governance of Canadian territory in a manner
which undoubtedly is inconsistent with our current constitutional arrange-
ments. The fact that those changes would be profound, or that they would
purport to have a significance with respect to international law, does not
negate their nature as amendments to the Constitution of Canada.'39
While the Court in the prior references regarding amendments main-
tained a form of interpretivist approach, in this decision the Court moves
entirely away from an author- and text-centred approach to the issue of
amendments, relying instead on a discourse of Canadian constitutionalism
made up of, among other statements, historical narrative, principles, and
international law. This approach is signalled in the opening paragraph's
reference to "principles":
137. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Secession Reference].
138. The amending formula that was ultimately adopted in 1982 is the current Part V of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. As the Federal
Report notes, this amending procedure requires legislative authorization but not public consultation
(Canada, supra note 103 at 8). For a commentary on the amending formula, see Stephen A. Scott,
"Pussycat, Pussycat or Patriation and the New Constitutional Amendment Processes" (1982) 20
U.W.O.L. Rev. 247.
139. Supra note 137 at para.84.
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In our view, it is not possible to answer the questions that have been put
to us without a consideration of a number of underlying principles. An
exploration of the meaning and nature of these underlying principles is
not merely of academic interest. On the contrary, such an exploration is
of immense practical utility. Only once those underlying principles have
been examined and delineated may a considered response to the ques-
tions we are required to answer emerge.
140
The Court has clearly moved away from its rejection of political "theory"
noted earlier in this paper.
In this decision, the Court indicates that its shift away from the written
constitution is not a rejection of the primacy of the text because "[a] writ-
ten constitution promotes legal certainty and predictability, and it provides
a foundation and a touchstone for the exercise of constitutional judicial
review. ' 14 1 However, the Court does indicate that extra-textual principles
and values are what permit a constitutional order to develop and change
and what can fill "gaps in the express terms of the constitutional text" 142:
These supporting principles and rules, which include constitutional con-
ventions and the workings of Parliament, are a necessary part of our
Constitution because problems or situations may arise which are not ex-
pressly dealt with by the text of the Constitution. In order to endure over
time, a constitution must contain a comprehensive set of rules and prin-
ciples which are capable of providing an exhaustive legal framework for
our system of government. Such principles and rules emerge from an
understanding of the constitutional text itself, the historical context, and
previous judicial interpretations of constitutional meaning. In our view,
there are four fundamental and organizing principles of the Constitution
which are relevant to addressing the question before us (although this
enumeration is by no means exhaustive): federalism; democracy; con-
stitutionalism and the rule of law; and respect for minorities.1
43
In referencing constitutional principles, in a sense the Court is moving
beyond author to discourse; the way the principles are described gives
them a sense of being, in fact, authorless: the Court notes that behind the
written word is "a historical lineage stretching back through the ages,"' 44
140. Ibid. at para.1.
141. Ibid. at para.53.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid. at para.32.
144. Ibid. at para.49.
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and that some principles such as the democratic principle are authorless
because they are self-evident:
[T]he democracy principle can best be understood as a sort of baseline
against which the framers of our Constitution, and subsequently, our
elected representatives under it, have always operated. It is perhaps for
this reason that the principle was not explicitly identified in the text of
the Constitution Act, 1867 itself. To have done so might have appeared
redundant, even silly, to the framers. 45
In its citation of principles, the Court in essence accepts one theory of
constitutional amendment, that even where a text such as Canada's consti-
tution is silent on the issue of "core or fundamental features"'146 that cannot
be amended, there remain unassailable values beyond the reach of elected
officials. The Court notes, for example, that amendment is not a pure mat-
ter of democratic self-will or majority rule:
[O]ur belief in democracy may be harmonized with our belief in consti-
tutionalism. Constitutional amendment often requires some form of sub-
stantial consensus precisely because the content of the underlying prin-
ciples of our Constitution demand it. By requiring broad support in the
form of an "enhanced majority" to achieve constitutional change, the
Constitution ensures that minority interests must be addressed before
proposed changes which would affect them may be enacted.'47
In the context of the reference decisions I have cited here, the Seces-
sion Reference is also different in one highly significant way from the
prior cases. The Court states:
The Constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of the people of
Canada. It lies within the power of the people of Canada, acting through
their various governments duly elected and recognized under the Con-
stitution, to effect whatever constitutional arrangements are desired within
Canadian territory, including, should it be so desired, the secession of
Quebec from Canada.
148
This is an acknowledgment, not evident in the prior decisions, that the
ultimate power of constitutional amendment lies with the "people of
145. Ibid. at para.62.
146. Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 90 at 278.
147. Secession Reference, supra note 137 at para.77.
148. Ibid. at para.85.
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Canada" who act through their governments. Prior decisions constructed
constitutional actors as governments only. This acknowledgment of citi-
zens as well as governments may be in part due to the fact that the refer-
ence question had much to do with the bindingness of a referendum as
expressing the will of the Quebec people. The Court notes that Constitu-
tionality is not merely the expression of the will of the majority:
Canadians have never accepted that ours is a system of simple majority
rule. Our principle of democracy, taken in conjunction with the other
constitutional principles discussed here, is richer. Constitutional gov-
emnment is necessarily predicated on the idea that the political represen-
tatives of the people of a province have the capacity and the power to
commit the province to be bound into the future by the constitutional
rules being adopted. These rules are "binding" not in the sense of frus-
trating the will of a majority of a province, but as defining the majority
which must be consulted in order to alter the fundamental balances of
political power (including the spheres of autonomy guaranteed by the
principle of federalism), individual rights, and minority rights in our
society. Of course, those constitutional rules are themselves amenable to
amendment, but only through a process of negotiation which ensures
that there is an opportunity for the constitutionally defined rights of all
the parties to be respected and reconciled.
In this way, our belief in democracy may be harmonized with our
belief in constitutionalism.149
In identifying the "people of Canada" as the ultimate constitutional
amending authors, who must negotiate with the people of Quebec who
express their will in response to a clear question in a referendum, the Court
also is taken into a discussion of what types of procedures ensure that the
authorship by the "people of Canada" is legitimate: procedures that ensure
respect for minority viewpoints, deliberation, negotiation. As the Court
notes,
the conduct of the parties assumes primary constitutional significance.
The negotiation process must be conducted with an eye to the constitu-
tional principles we have outlined, which must inform the actions of all
the participants in the negotiation process.
Refusal of a party to conduct negotiations in a manner consistent
with constitutional principles and values would seriously put at risk the
149. Ibid. at paras.76-77.
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legitimacy of that party's assertion of its rights, and perhaps the negotia-
tion process as a whole.'
The Court's construction of the people of Canada as constitutional au-
thors is significant because it departs from the prevailing view I cite above
of Canadian constitutional action that has been criticized by commenta-
tors. The Court's construction of the people of Canada as constitutional
amending authors was precursed by the circumstances of the efforts to
amend the Canadian constitution after 1982 but prior to the Secession Ref-
erence. As Russell writes, when the Trudeau government proposed to
patriate the Constitution, it represented its proposal as a "people's pack-
age" and sought to build legitimacy for it via a special parliamentary com-
mittee which for the first time televised its proceedings and heard submis-
sions from interest groups. 5' Russell argues that this move "created a new
public expectation about popular participation in constitution making-an
expectation that the architects of the Meech Lake Accord would ignore to
their peril. It also produced a new set of players in the constitutional pro-
cess-the interest groups whose rights claims gained constitutional recog-
nition and whose perspective is distinctly indifferent to federalism."'52 Alan
C. Cairns describes the pre-1982 process as one which created "Charter
Canadians."'53 Also significant was the fact that the Trudeau government's
proposed amending formula included provision for a referendum in the
face of government deadlock. 54 This provision was eventually removed
from the amending formula.
As Cairns notes, prior to 1982, "Canada ... never enjoyed a strong
tradition of public participation in the formal process of constitutional
change."' 5 According to Cairns, "[t]he most important public role, how-
ever, was that of an audience carefully monitored and manipulated by the
government players."' 5 6 However, the patriation process rallied Canadians:
As the recognition sank in that in closed intergovernmental bargaining
many of the rights fashioned and refined in the Special Joint Committee
150. Ibid. at paras.94-95.
151. Russell, supra note 105 at 113-14.
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and in the House of Commons had been diluted, a blizzard of angry
protest emerged, particularly from women's groups and from various
aboriginal organisations. The former were furious that the clause guar-
anteeing the Charter's rights and freedoms 'equally to male and female
persons' had been made subject to an override by a group of male first
ministers in secret sessions. The latter were angry that a clause by which
the 'aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognised and affirmed' had been completely deleted. 157
Both protests were successful. "Given the general, albeit fluctuating,
government domination of the constitutional reform process through Ca-
nadian history, this successful assault on executive federalism by
organisations of women and aboriginal peoples was in itself an event of
great constitutional significance."' 58 However, where the amending for-
mula is concerned, Cairns suggests that over the course of negotiation,
"[t]he disappearance of the federal formula [for referenda on amendments]
in the final horse-trading thus thwarted a significant symbolic reconstruc-
tion of the Canadian polity, and instead confirmed that as far as constitu-
tional change is concerned Canada is a country of governments and not a
country of citizens."'15 9
Since 1982, Canadians have recently witnessed two large-scale efforts
to amend the Constitution Act, 1982 in order that Quebec might sign on,
but neither has achieved this aim and commentators have suggested that
the failure of the processes lies in part in the illegitimacy of the would-be
amending authors. As Russell writes, the Meech Lake process was "closed
and elitist in nature" which led to its downfall: "[T]he first ministers and
their advisers, did not realize how much the conditions of constitutional
politics in Canada were changing. They did not appreciate how seriously
[interest groups] ... took their recent enfranchisement as constitutional
players."'6 ° For Russell, Meech Lake was an "objectionable process":
Members of the public and of opposition parties participating in [public
hearings] ... objected to being told they could talk about the accord all
they wished but not a word would be changed unless they spotted some
'egregious error.' By insisting that the Meech accord be adopted regard-
less of how it fared in public discussions, its sponsors did more than
erode the accord's legitimacy. They reduced public respect in the En-
157. Ibid. at 124.
158. Ibid. at 125.
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glish-speaking provinces for the legitimacy of the parliamentary institu-
tions the governments supporting Meech presumed to dominate.'6
The Federal Government proposed constitutional change again in 1991.
At the time, the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee issued a report, A Renewed
Canada, which proposed a "Canada clause" with a poetic constitutional
preamble beginning with "We are the people of Canada," '62 which echoes
the constitutional declarations of the American "We the People." How-
ever, the process that grew into the Charlottetown Accord was also criti-
cized for being consultative in name only:
Consultation is important, but it is not enough. Politicians claimed that
this was the most participatory round of constitutional talks ever, that
citizens were thoroughly consulted-through the Spicer Commission,
the constitutional conferences, and the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee.
[The National Action Committee on the Status of Women] NAC partici-
pated in every way that was open to it, but our experience shows that the
only place it matters to be is in the room where the decisions are being
made.
For women this process was Meech Lake II. When the consultations
were over, the doors closed again, key results of the consultations were
ignored, and the interests of the players in the room dominated."'63
The response to the Charlottetown Accord was ultimately the October
1992 referendum. In this referendum, "the Canadian people, for the first
time in their history as a political community, acted as Canada's ultimate
constitutional authority"' 64 and rejected the proposal.
It has been tempting for many commentators to observe that Canada is
mainly a federation of governments. The Supreme Court of Canada's de-
cision in the Secession Reference, I would argue, articulates a rather dif-
ferent view of Canadians in its explicit indicating that Canadians are as
self-constituting, and self-writing, as a body, in an on-going way, rather
than a collection of governments. Our foundational documents, if they are
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amended, are to be amended by Canadians and their government represen-
tatives, who are part of a larger discourse of Canadian constitutionalism
that includes not only textual interpretation, but a historical self-aware-
ness and recognition of contemporary values. The Court's decision finally
is also significant in that it includes reference to the People of the country,
which remedies an absence in the constitutional document, which does not
refer to the Canadian people.
Conclusion
This paper has explored ideas about authorship and how the
conceptualization of authorship is important to constitutional legal theo-
ries about how constitutional texts are to be interpreted, about their legiti-
macy, and about the role ofjudges. Where constitutional amendments are
concerned, I have argued that authorship continues to be important, for
how the identity of amending authors is constructed by a constitutional
text or by a Court indicates a great deal about the constitutional order of a
country. In surveying the Supreme Court of Canada's discussions about
amending authors, I suggest that the Court has taken an increasingly ex-
pansive and, I would argue, Foucauldian, view of amending authorship.
The Court in the Senate Reference adds to a narrow emphasis on original
intent a sense that amending authors had to include regional representa-
tion. In the Patriation Reference, the Court expands its notion of author-
ship by directing that constitutional convention, as manifest in the intent
of the actors bound by the conventions, dictates that provincial, even more
so than regional, interests had to constitute the act of amending author-
ship. Finally, in the Secession Reference, the Court's discursive view of
the principles behind Canadian constitutionalism and amendment mean
that ultimately, amending authors are the Canadian people, represented in
government, and acting according to an historically aware process of de-
liberation and consultation. From a country that lacked any self-amending
formula at all, Canada's constitution discourse, as constructed in the Se-
cession Reference seems truly and finally to constitute Canadian citizens
as self-governing, self-constituting, and self-writing.
